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Abstract
Empirical studies of social interactions address a multitude of de¯nitional, econo-
metric and measurement issues associated with role of interpersonal and social group
in°uences in economic decisions. Applications range from studies of crime patterns,
neighborhood in°uences on upbringing and conformist behavior, mutual in°uences
among classmates and keeping up with roommates in colleges regarding academic and
social activities, to herding and to learning about social services. The entry reviews
several instances of successful identi¯cation of e®ects emanating from others' behavior
as distinct from characteristics of others. Data sets with increasingly rich contextual
information will allow estimation of complex models of economic decisions.
Related entries: educational ¯nance, geographic information systems, herd behavior,
natural and quasi-natural experiments, neighbors and neighborhoods, policy exper-
iments, psychology of social networks, social multipliers, social network formation,
sociology of social networks, theory of social interactions, Tiebout hypothesis.
Keywords: Social interactions, peer e®ects, contextual e®ects, neighborhood choice,
neighbors, neighborhoods, neighborhood e®ects, laboratory experiments, ¯eld experi-
ments, self selection, social networks.
JEL Codes: C25, I30, R00
1 Introduction
The empirical economics literature on social interactions addresses the signi¯cance of
the social context in economic decisions. Decisions of individuals who share a social
milieu are likely to be interdependent. Recognizing the nature of such interdependence
1in a variety of conventional and unconventional settings and measuring empirically the
role of social interactions poses complex econometric questions. Their resolution may
be critical for a multitude of phenomena in economic and social life and of matters of
public policy.
The social context enters in a variety of ways. One is that individuals care not
only about their own purely private outcomes, e.g. the kinds of cars they drive or the
education they acquire, but also about outcomes of others, such as the kinds of cars or
the education of their friends. This type of interpersonal e®ect is known as endogenous
social e®ect (or interaction), because it depends on decisions of others in the same
social milieu. Individuals may also care about personal characteristics of others, that
is whether they are young or old, black or white, rich or poor, trendy or conventional,
and so on, and about other attributes of the social milieu that may not be properly
characterized as deliberate decisions of others. The latter is known as exogenous social
or contextual e®ect. In addition, individuals in the same or similar social settings tend
to act similarly because they share common unobservable factors. Such an interaction
pattern is known as correlated e®ects. This terminology is due to Manski (1993).
Emergence of social interdependencies is natural if individuals share a common
resource or space in a way that is not paid but still generates constraints on individual
action. This is also known as pecuniary externalities. Individuals who try to form
expectations about future outcomes of current decisions, like occupational choice, may
rely on lessons from the actions of others and therefore end up mimicking their behavior.
Endogenous social interactions are a case of real externalities, a pervasive feature of
economic behavior.
Theorizing in this area must lie in the interface of economics, sociology and psychol-
ogy and often is imprecise. Terms like social interactions, neighborhood e®ects, social
capital and peer e®ects are often used as synonyms although they may have di®erent
connotations. Empirical distinctions between endogenous, contextual and correlated
e®ects are critical for policy analysis because of the \social multiplier," as we see further
below.
Joint dependence among individuals' decisions and characteristics within a social
milieu is complicated further by the fact that in many interesting circumstances indi-
2viduals in e®ect choose the social context. E.g., individuals choose their friends and
their neighborhoods and thus their neighborhood e®ects as well. Such choices involve
information that is in part unobservable to the analyst, and therefore require making
inferences among the possible factors which contribute to decisions [Brock and Durlauf
(2001) and Mo±tt (2001)]. The present entry focuses on highlighting the signi¯cance of
key empirical ¯ndings and owes a lot to Durlauf (2004), the most comprehensive review
to date that examines the methodological basis, statistical reliability and conceptual
and empirical breadth of the neighborhood e®ects literature.
2 Empirical Framework
Let individual i's outcome !i; a scalar, be a linear function of a vector of observable
individual characteristics, Xi; of a vector of contextual e®ects, Yn(i); which describe
i's neighborhood n(i); and of the expected value of the !j's of the members of neigh-
borhood n(i); j 2 n(i): It is straightforward to incorporate social interactions into
economic models in a manner that is fully compatible with economic reasoning, that
is by positing that individuals maximize a utility function subject to constraints and
obtain a behavioral equation such as:
!i = k + cXi + dYn(i) + Jmn(i) + ²i; (1)
where ²i is a random error and k a constant. Abstracting at the moment from the
issue that individual i may have deliberately chosen neighborhood, n(i); and stating
that conditional on individual characteristics, contextual e®ects and the event that i
is a member of neighborhood n(i) the expectation of ²i; is zero, allows to focus on
the estimation of such models. Critical next steps for translating theoretical models to
empirical applications is to assume social equilibrium and that individuals hold rational
expectations over mn(i): That is, individuals' expectations are con¯rmed in that they
are exactly equal to what the model predicts. So, taking the expectation of !i and
setting it equal to mn(i) allows us to solve for mn(i): Substituting back into (1) yields a










Yn(i) + ²i: (2)
This simple linear model obscures the richness that nonlinear social interactions
models make possible, like multiplicity of equilibria [Brock and Durlauf (2001)]. Yet,
it does facilitate studying other aspects. For example, it does con¯rm that endogenous
social e®ects generate feedbacks which magnify the e®ects of neighborhood character-
istics. That the e®ect of Yn(i) is d
1¡J; and not just d: It also con¯rms why it is tempting
for empirical researchers to study individual outcomes as functions of all observables.
Following the pioneering work of Datcher (1982), a great variety of individual outcomes
have been studied in the context of di®erent neighborhoods and typically signi¯cant
e®ects have been found. Deriving causal results requires suitable data.
Manski (1993) emphasized that the practice of including neighborhood averages of
individual e®ects as contextual e®ects, Yn(i) = Xn(i); may fail to identify endogenous
separately from exogenous interactions, that is to estimate J separately from d: How-
ever, partial identi¯cation is possible. That is, if the neighborhood attributes are re-
stricted to the neighborhood averages of its inhabitants' characteristics, or Yn(i) = Xn(i);
then regressing individual outcomes on neighborhood averages of individual character-
istics as contextual e®ects allows us to estimate Jc+d
1¡J : A statistically signi¯cant estimate
of the coe±cient of Xn(i) implies that at least one type of social interaction is present,
either J or d or both are nonzero.
If it is plausible to exclude some of neighborhood averages of individual covariates,
then identi¯cation may be possible. Also, if nonlinearities are inherent in the basic
model speci¯cation, identi¯cation again may be possible. A noteworthy case in point
here is Drewianka (2003) who studies two-sided matching in the marriage market and
¯nds that it allows identi¯cation of endogenous and exogenous social interactions.
The logic of the model requires that the two sides of the market contain an additional
source of variation: the greater the number of potential marriage partners, the higher
the probability that a match will occur. There is an inherent multiplier e®ect at
work here. This likelihood depends on the rate at which other people match up, an
endogenous social e®ect. Drewianka's results show that a 10 percent increase in the
4fraction of the population that is unmarried causes the marriage rate of never-married
men to fall by 10 percent and that of never-married women by 7 percent.
An interesting consequence of endogenous social interactions is in amplifying di®er-
ences in the average neighborhood behavior across neighborhoods. In fact, Glaeser et
al. (2003) use directly such patterns in the data to estimate a social multiplier. This
is de¯ned for a change in a particular fundamental determinant of an outcome as the
ratio of a total e®ect, which includes a direct e®ect to an individual outcome plus the
sum total of the indirect e®ects through the feedback from the e®ects on others in the
social group, to the direct e®ect. It is easy to see that as the ratio of the \group level"
coe±cient, the coe±cient of Yn(i) in Equ. (2), to the \individual level" coe±cient,




1¡J: It follows that a social multiplier
greater than one implies endogenous social interactions, 0 < J < 1: This approach
must deal, in practice, with dependence across decisions of individuals belonging to
the same group, which is implied by non-random sorting in terms of unobservables. It
is particularly useful in delivering ranges of estimates for the endogenous social e®ect
and when individual data are hard to obtain.
This is the case with crime data. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) mo-
tivate their study of crime and social interactions by the extraordinary variation of
incidence of crime across US metropolitan areas over and above di®erences in funda-
mentals. If social interactions are present, variations in observed outcomes are larger
than what would be expected from variations in underlying fundamentals. Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) regress actual crime rates against predicted crime
rates, which are formed by multiplying percentages of US individuals in each of eight
age categories by the crime rate of persons in that category. They perform such regres-
sions at the level of county and state cross-sectionally and for the entire US over time.
Their results imply large social multipliers, which increase with the level of aggregation
exactly as their basic theory would predict are consistent with large endogenous social
interaction coe±cients.
It is possible to modify this basic model in order to study several other areas
involving economic decisions akin to social interactions. For example, di®usion of
innovations, herding and adoption of norms or other institutions by a population involve
5ideas that are conceptually related to social interactions. Also, J may be negative, as
in the case of land development, which is conceivably due to congestion.
3 Identi¯cation of Social Interactions Using Obser-
vational Data on \Natural Experiments"
Several researchers have sought to identify social interactions by exploiting uniquely
suitable features of observational data, that are often referred to as \natural experi-
ments." For example, consider outcomes for children from families with several children
who share the common in°uence of unobservable family factors, such as parental values
and competence, taste for education and time spent with children, and other unobserv-
ables that a®ect upbringing of household members living in close proximity. They also
share the variation in neighborhood e®ects that is produced by families' residential
moves. By using observations on several children from the same family who are sepa-
rated in age by at least three years, Aaronson (1998) controls for family-speci¯c char-
acteristics. This obviates the need to control for the impact of self-selection in terms
of unobservable neighborhood characteristics. He uses data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics and ¯nds large and statistically signi¯cant contextual neighborhood
e®ects, but his models exclude endogenous social e®ects. His results are robust to
changes in estimation techniques and in sample and variable de¯nitions, but are sensi-
tive to the formulation of neighborhood characteristic proxy. Incomplete speci¯cation
of family characteristics is an important concern, and its consequences for the robust-
ness of estimated relationships are aptly demonstrated by Ginther et al. (2000).
Grinblatt et al. (2004) use data for all residents of two large Finnish provinces, that
is millions of observations, and establish that automobile purchase decisions by close
residential neighbors in°uence one another. The measured endogenous neighborhood
e®ects are strongest among individuals belonging to the same \social class" (especially
if they belong to lower income classes), or when the cars they purchase are of the same
make or even the same model. These ¯ndings mitigate in favor of information sharing
instead of \keeping up with the Joneses." We note that excluding neighborhood means
6of demographics as contextual e®ects are reasonably plausible in this case: there is no
reason why the average age of my neighbors should a®ect directly my taste in cars.
Luttmer (2005) uses data from the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households,
augmented with Census data from the Public Use Microdata Areas, and examines
how self-reported well being varies with own and neighbors' incomes and of other
characteristics. He interprets his ¯ndings as direct evidence that people have taste
over their neighbors' incomes. That is, after controlling for an individuals own income,
higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness
in terms of a variety of measures.
Sacerdote (2001) exploits the fact that freshman year roommates and dormmates
are randomly assigned at Dartmouth College, thus producing a natural quasi-experimental
setting for studying peer e®ects. Sacerdote posits that an individual's grade point av-
erage is a function of an individual's own academic ability prior to college entrance, of
social habits, and of the academic ability and grade point average of his roommates.
Sacerdote ¯nds that peers have an impact on each others' grade point average and on
decisions to join social groups such as fraternities. He does not, however, ¯nd residen-
tial peer e®ects in other major college decisions, such as choice of college major. He
¯nds peer e®ects in grade point average at the individual room level | you keep up
with your roommates! | whereas peer e®ects in fraternity membership occur both at
the room level and the entire dorm level | dorms are conformist! These data pro-
vide strong evidence for the existence of peer e®ects in student outcomes, even among
highly selected college students who may be otherwise quite homogeneous albeit in
close proximity to one another. Peer e®ects are smaller the more directly a decision is
related to labor market activities.
4 Peer E®ects in Classrooms and Schools
Social interactions in classrooms, peer e®ects, are particularly interesting in under-
standing schooling as an economic activity and its consequences for inequality of social
outcomes. Whether students bene¯t from classmates with di®erent characteristics and
academic performance and whether the e®ect is di®erent depending upon whether one's
7classroom peers are more or less able is important for education policy and the actual
functioning of schools. In other words, deciding whether or not students should be
\tracked," that is administratively segregated in terms of di®erent characteristics, are
the sort of policy questions which rest on understanding peer e®ects quantitatively.
Hoxby (2000) posits a relationship between individual academic achievement by a
male student in a particular school and grade as the sum of what the mean achievement
among males would have been in the absence of peer e®ects, of a term that is propor-
tional to the percentage of females in the classroom, plus an error. She extends such
a relationship to the case of several racial groups, which is particularly appropriate
for the Texas Schools Project data that she uses. Her identi¯cation strategy involves
exploring the panel structure of the data under the plausible assumption that there is
natural idiosyncratic variation across successive cohorts in terms of gender, race and
other individual attributes. Hoxby ¯nds that students are a®ected by the achievement
levels of their peers: an exogenous one point increase in peers' reading scores raises a
student's own score between 0.14 and 0.4 points. Peer e®ects are stronger intra-race,
and there is evidence of contextual e®ects: both male and female students perform bet-
ter in classrooms that are more female despite the fact that females' math performance
is about the same as that of males.
The role of gender is corroborated by research by Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005),
who use data on the universe of students admitted to US medical schools for a par-
ticular year. One positive peer e®ect in US medical schools that they ¯nd pertains to
female students, who bene¯t from attending medical schools that have other female
students with relatively high scores on the verbal reasoning section of the Medical
College Admission Test.
Of particular interest recently have been studies of the impact of school racial in-
tegration in the US on student performance. Let us consider Boston's Metropolitan
Council for Educational Opportunities (METCO) program, a voluntary desegregation
program. The program allows mainly black inner-city kids from Boston public schools
to commute to mainly white suburban communities in the Boston area that accom-
modate them in their public schools. Angrist and Lang (2004) show that although
the receiving districts, which tend to higher mean academic performance, experience a
8mean decrease due to the program, the e®ects are merely \compositional", and there
is little evidence of statistically signi¯cant e®ects of METCO students on their non-
METCO classmates. Analysis with micro data from a particular receiving district
(Brookline, Massachusetts) generally con¯rms this ¯nding, but also produces some ev-
idence of negative e®ects on minority students in the receiving district. METCO is a
noteworthy social experiment, which was initiated by civil rights activists seeking to
bring about defacto desegregation of schools. Lack of evidence of negative peer e®ects
is particularly useful for informing desegregation policy. Still, there is self-selection in
the participants on both sides.
5 Estimation of Social Interactions in Experimental
Settings
Experimental data used by social interactions studies come from two types of delib-
erate experiments, ¯eld and laboratory experiments. A well known ¯eld experiment
is Project STAR, an experimental program in the U.S. State of Tennessee that ran-
domly assigned entering kindergarten students into three di®erent class sizes and then
randomly assigned teachers to them. A recent study that utilizes Project STAR data
is Graham (2005). He seeks to estimate a relationship like (1) by measuring \excess"
variance patterns across groups of exogenously given, but varying, sizes of classrooms
that are associated with randomly assigned students and teachers. Graham compares
contrasts in excess variance across small and large classrooms and ¯nds social multi-
pliers between 1.07 and 2.31, and 1.05 to 3.07, for math and reading achievement, re-
spectively. Studies of this type need to discriminate between excess between-classroom
variance, which is due to social interactions, from that due to group-level heterogeneity.
Du°o and Saez (2005) study, using experimental data, how social interactions
among employees of a large U.S. university may in°uence participation in a tax de-
ferred account retirement plan. The experiment more than tripled the attendance rate
of those who received a small monetary reward for participating, doubled that of those
not thus \treated" but who belonged to the same departments as the treated, and
9signi¯cantly increased participation in the target program by individuals from treated
departments, and did so almost as much by those who did not receive direct encourage-
ment. While clearly social interactions e®ect may coexist with di®erential treatment
and motivational reward e®ects, social interactions are also relevant for the e®ect of
treatment on attendance and of attendance on participation. The authors conclude
that the role of social interactions in amplifying the e®ect of treatment is unambigu-
ous, in spite of the fact that they cannot distinguish unambiguously between the three
di®erent e®ects.
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is a set of large randomized ¯eld experiments that
were conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in several
large U.S. cities. The experiments o®ered poor households, who were chosen by lot-
tery from among residents of high-poverty public housing projects, housing vouchers
and logistical assistance through NGOs for the purpose of relocating to precisely de-
¯ned as \better" neighborhoods. Several studies based on data from these experiments
show that outcomes after relocation have improved for children, primarily for females,
on account of education, risky behavior and physical health, but the e®ects on male
youth were adverse. Regarding outcomes for adults, such as economic self-su±ciency
or physical health, the picture is more mixed. Kling, Liebman and Katz (2005) ¯nd
that four to seven years after relocation families (primarily female-headed ones with
children) lived in safer neighborhoods that had lower poverty rates than those of a con-
trol group that were not o®ered vouchers. Unfortunately, there is serious controversy
over how to interpret these ¯ndings in the context of policy design for large scale policy
interventions [Sobel (2006)].
Turning next to laboratory experiments, a notable study is Ichino and Falk (2006).
The experiment involves workers in pairs stu±ng envelopes, with control being provided
by subjects working alone in a room. These authors ¯nd that standard deviations
of output are signi¯cantly smaller within pairs than between pairs and that social
interactions raise productivity: average output per person is greater when subjects
work in pairs. They also show that social interactions are asymmetric: low productivity
workers are more sensitive to the behavior of high productivity workers as peers. Their
setting does reduce some of the noise associated with \natural" experiments but does
10not allow for contextual e®ects.
6 Identi¯cation of Social Interactions with Self Se-
lection to Groups and Sorting
Presence of non-random sorting on unobservables is a major challenge for the econo-
metric identi¯cation of social interactions models. Brock and Durlauf (2001) turned
adversity into advantage by recognizing that self-selection itself, the endogeneity of
neighborhood n(i) in Equ. (1), may be brought to bear additional evidence on iden-
ti¯cation. That is, if it is possible to estimate a neighborhood selection rule, then
correction for selection bias via the mean estimated bias, the so-called Heckman term,
introduces an additional regressor in the right hand side of (1) whose neighborhood
average is not a causal e®ect. Ioannides and Zabel (2004) implement this method
successfully using micro data for a sample of households and their ten closest residen-
tial neighbors from the American Housing Survey and contextual information for the
census tracts in which these individuals reside. Endogeneity of the average of one's
neighbors's housing demands, an endogenous social e®ect, is instrumented by treating
housing demands by a group of close neighbors as a simultaneous system of equations.
By choosing neighborhoods, census tracts in this application, individuals choose desir-
able social interactions. Ioannides and Zabel work with an otherwise standard housing
demand model and ¯nd a very signi¯cant and large endogenous social e®ect along with
very signi¯cant contextual e®ects in the form of unobservable group e®ects. Several
other studies have sought to use instrumental variables to account for self-selection.
The critical role of local public ¯nance of education in the U.S. has been studied ex-
tensively as a link between sorting into residential communities and socioeconomic
outcomes. See entries on \Educational Finance" and "The Tiebout Hypothesis."
116.1 Social Interactions and Social Networks
The intuitive appeal of the notion that information transmitted through social dis-
course in°uences the behavior of individuals who interact socially has motivated recent
research in labor markets, welfare program participation, and stock market partici-
pation. Ioannides and Loury (2004) review the labor market literature. Hong et al.
(2004) use data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey and de¯ne social house-
holds as those who know at least some of their neighbors, interact with them at least
occasionally and attend religious services. They show that controlling for wealth, race,
education and risk tolerance, social households are more likely to invest in the stock
market, with this e®ect being stronger in U.S. states where stock-market participation
rates are higher. Aizer and Currie (2004) examine \network e®ects" in the utilization
of publicly funded prenatal care. They ¯nd that pregnant women are most likely to be
in°uenced in their use of public prenatal-care programs by new mothers from the same
area and ethnic group. Such use is highly correlated within groups de¯ned using race,
ethnicity and residence in the same neighborhoods (de¯ned as the areas of ¯ve-digit zip
code), and persists even after accounting for unobserved characteristics by including
zip code{year ¯xed e®ects. The richness of their data (from more than 3.5 million
birth certi¯cates from California) allows them to de¯ne ¯xed e®ects for the hospital
of delivery interacted with the year of delivery. The estimates of network e®ects are
then either reduced or eliminated. This casts doubt on the idea that the observed
correlations can be interpreted as evidence of information sharing originating in ethnic
and geographic proximity. They point instead to di®erences in the behavior of the
low-income women involved, and of the institutions serving them, as the primary ex-
planation for group-level di®erences in the take-up of publicly provided prenatal care.
They examine the role of institutions by comparing the behavior of foreign-born with
that of native-born Hispanic women. They ¯nd that such \network" e®ects are quite
similar for both those groups of foreign-born and native-born Hispanic women. They
conclude that it is di®erences in the behavior of institutions and not information shar-
ing that explains the established correlations between neighborhood and ethnic group
membership in prenatal care use.
127 Conclusions
Social interactions are ubiquitous and interest in estimating their e®ects is expanding
rapidly in numerous areas of economics and is motivating important methodological ad-
vances. For econometricians, key challenges include social interactions e®ects on market
outcomes coexisting with feedbacks from the characteristics of individual market par-
ticipants via their impacts on prices, consequences of self-selection and the attendant
role of presence of individual and group unobservables. Fundamentally and in the light
of ever improving data availability, social interactions empirics will rely increasingly
critically on careful theorizing that involves precise de¯nitions of social interactions,
possibly by calling on psychology and sociology to de¯ne appropriate boundaries, and
their scope, and must facilitate use of data from di®erent sources. The likely payo® is
enormous: better understanding of social forces in the modern economy, with individu-
als sharing information while self-selecting into social groups and living and working in
close proximity to one another as in ¯rms and cities, the hallmark of modern economic
life.
Yannis M. Ioannides Tufts University
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